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ARIANNA BETTI
Introduetion
When Twardowski came to Lvov in 1895, his aim was to establish a
philosophical trend heavily inspired by Brentanism, although peppered with
Bolzanian ideas. As shows from a comparison between the lectures in logic
he gave in Vienna in 1894/5 and in Lvov in 1895/6, Twardowski's teaching
activity in Poland was even more Brentanian than in Vienna, I There is little
doubt that the reason for this is that Brentano's thought was unknown in late
19th Century Poland.' It is well-known that Twardowski's own thought was
also significantly influenced by Bolzano, and that he played also a major
role in disseminating some of Bolzano's ideas in Poland, the most important
being perhaps the notion oftime-independent truth.
1 have previously discussed in several papers specific Bolzanian
elements present in the Polish tradition. This paper will not, for the most
part, add anything in particular to that. The new - and rather blunt -
hypothesis to be put forward here is that, despite appearances, Twardowski
also contributed de facto to slowing down the reception of Bolzano's most
modem logical discoveries. For in Poland Bolzano was to remain one
logician among many for rather long. It was chiefly thanks to two factors
that Bolzano's star could, slowly, begin to rise in Poland, or, at least, that the
fundamental achievements of his logic could be known. One factor is anti-
psychologistic (more precisely Platonistic) influence coming from Husserl
and from Twardowski's student Lukasiewicz. The other factor is the change
in the conception of logic which took Polish logic from, say, Sigwart, to
Tarski through Lesniewski and Lukasiewicz,
What I am going to say is meant to have impact on the standard picture
of the all-Brentanian background of the Lvov-Warsaw school, though my
account will be limited to two pupils of Twardowski's of the first
generation, Lukasiewicz and Lesniewski, I hope this paper will contribute
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both to the debate on the scope of Polish Brentanism, and to prompting
further investigation into the reception ofBolzano's thought in Poland.
I. Bolzano and the Standard Picture ofthe Background
ofthe Lvov- Warsaw School
The fo11owing is, roughly put, what for some time has been suggested in
reconstructions of the philosophical heritage of the Lvov-Warsaw School.
Twardowski was a direct pupil ofBrentano's; Lukasiewicz, Lesniewski and
Kotarbiáski were direct pupils of Twardowski's, a sort ofthird generation of
Brentanians, as it were.' So, ifthe Lvov-Warsaw School has a grandfather,
this was Brentano. Although more recently attempts have been made to
include in the cast of characters also Bolzano," the idea that Brentano's
influence has been enormous and perhaps incomparable to that of any other
contemporary philosopher in Poland is, as well-testified by the title of this
co11ection, little disputed. The problem with this picture is its monolithic
character: zoom in further, and you no longer see Brentanian homogeneity.
By now it is common knowledge that particular Polish issues come from
Bolzano. These include Twardowski's and Lesniewski's (versions of)
sempiternal truth (the view that a truth-bearer does not change its truth value
"i:f
over time), Lukasiewicz's logical probability, and Tarski's logical
consequence.' More recently, Bolzano's influence on Ajdukiewicz's
conception of analyticity, on Ajdukiewicz's 1923 notion of consequence,
and on the analysis of truth-bearers and their ontological counterparts in the
early Lesniewski, Lukasiewicz and Kotarbitiski have been added to the
record." -
Telling the fu11 story of Bolzano's influence on the Lvov-Warsaw
School may seem - details aside - a relatively easy historical task. For we
seem to have a clear explanation for how the issues mentioned above were
passed on, namely Twardowski's mediation. This is certainly correct as to
the sempiternity of truth, for that position is distinctively anti-Brent:llian
and Twardowski took it up explicitly in 1900. But for all other notions
things are not this simpIe, and one cannot but suspect that the story of
Bolzano's influence bas not yet been told in its entirety.
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It is far from the aim of this paper to suggest that we should substitute
Bolzano for Brentano in the role of grandfather of the Lvov-Warsaw
School. This would be just naïve. I also do not intend to dispute Brentano's
general influence on choice of topics and methods in Polish analytic phi-
losophy. There is truth in the picture, obviously, as Twardowski's initial
target was the exportation of Brentanism onto Polish soil. There is also in-
disputably much more Brentano than Bolzano in some of Twardowski's
students, one clear example being Tadeusz Czezowski.
But that's exactly the point. There is little to object as to the Brentanian
mark on choice of topics and methods insofar as it was Twardowski 's ini-
tial choice. The Lvov-Warsaw School in its entirety, however, brought to-
gether individuals with diverging philosophical and logical tendencies, and
underwent intemal developments which should not be underestimated. The
variety and the change over time were due, among others, to the influence
of Husserl, Frege and Bolzano, which in turn contributed to at least two
Generationsstreite inside the Lvov-Warsaw School. Sure, Husserl was
himself a Brentanian, but he was Husserl, not Brentano: variety reigned in
the 'loose association' - to use an expression of Kevin Mulligan's - ofthe
Brentanians as weIl. The revolt against Brentano in the theory of judge-
ment - which resulted, among others, in Husserl's, Meinong's and Twar-
dowski's introduetion of states of affairs in their ontologies - makes it in
fact three Generationsstreite.' All this should make us wary of looking at
Lesniewski, Lukasiewicz, Kotarbiáski, let alone Tarski, as 'Brentanians',
flat.s
Therefore, the reason why the picture of the Brentanian roots of the
Lvov-Warsaw School is so homogeneous is, it seems, that it is taken from
the perspective of Twardowski's Brentanian background, peppered by iso-
lated, specific Bolzanian points.
Can we say that Twardowski misunderstood Bolzano? As to the spe-
cific issues just mentioned - locally, one might say - and against what
some scholars have claimed - we cannot. But we can say that as to Twar-
dowski's global consideration of Bolzano's thought. It is the latter I am
concerned with in this paper. Since the former issue is controversial, how-
ever, 1'11 say first something about Twardowski's construal of particular
Bolzanian ideas.
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Twardowski is said to have seriously misunderstood Bolzano in his
major work, On the Content and Object of Presentations (1894). True,
Twardowski exploited in his favour Bolzano's two-fold notion of the ob-
ject of a (subjective) Vorstellung, but I think we should take this as part of
the philosophical game, and not as a misrepresentation of Bolzano's
thought, pace Husserl. 9 To see the fundamental fairness with which Twar-
dowski treats Bolzano, one need only compare the account of Bolzano's
ideas given in his book with Marty's or Meinong's later misunderstand-
ings. Take for instanee Marty's claim in 1908 that Bolzano did not have
false propositions-in-themselves alongside true ones. Or take Marty's per-
sonal Bolzanologist Shmuel Hugo Bergmann, who did concede that Bol-
zano had false propositions-in-themselves, but thought he would have been
better off without. And, finally, take Meinong's identification of bis Ob-
jektive with propositions-in-themselves, the reason being, as in the case of
Marty and Bergmann, that propositions-in-themselves were mistaken for
truth-makers.l"
Such mistakes Twardowski never made. Twardowski took over a series
of distinctively Bolzanian traits without perverting their role or their sig-
nificance, and this, as one may expect, was of no little importance for the
Polish reception of specific Bolzanian issues.i' These comprise, first of all,
Bolzano's distinction between object and content of presentations which, ..~
as is well-known, Twardowski rescued in 1894; the consequent distinction
and discussion of the relationship between parts of the content (of a Vor-
stellung an sich in Bolzano) and parts ofthe object ofthat Vorstellung; the
difference between content and extension of an idea; and, as already men-
tioned, Bolzano's view that-truth is sempitemal. A very Bolzanian trait in
Twardowski's thought is also that he resisted - unlike Husserl and Mei-
nong - the introduetion of Annahmen in favour of a Bolzano-flavoured
semantic ascent: in Twardowski you can just present a judgement without
judging, as in Bolzano you can just present a proposition-in-itself without
judging. All these aspects left a long-lasting mark on the Lvov-Wsssaw
School.
Nevertheless, Twardowski seems to have misunderstood Bolzano in a
global sense, that is to say, he failed to see his greatness as a logician. So
did most others, but this is no excuse. Twardowski's global misunder-
standing ·of Bolzano is relevant for a correct assessment of the dissemina-
11 Lesniewski, Savonarola and The Painted Fish
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As far as I know, the sole remark about Bolzano we have in Lesniewski's
small oeuvre is from 1927, refers to the 1914 edition of Wissenschaftslehre
and is quite incidental. 12
For I did not consider it to be out ofthe question that Mr. Fraenkel uses the ex-
pression "improper set" in the fashion of expressions known from ordinary lan-
guage - "dead man", "false diamond", "painted fish" and so on (see for instanee
Hauptwerke der Philosophie in originalgetreuen Neudrucken. Band IV. Werke
Bemard Bolzanos I. Wissenschaftslehre in vier Bänden. Erster Band. Leipzig
1914. p. 257 and also the quotation from Savonarola on p. 79).13
tion and the popularity of Bolzano's thought in Poland, and of Twar-
dowski's role as a Vermittler of Bolzanism. For it is the hiatus between the
two aspects, the local and the global, that makes historical pictures like the
one at issue here difficult to take.
In the following I will restrict my discussion to the relationship - from
the global point of view just sketched, Twardowski's grasp of Bolzano's
stature - between Bolzano on the one hand, and Lesniewski and Lu-
kasiewicz on the other hand. Philosophers by training tumed logicians,
Lesniewski and Lukasiewicz were the pupils of Twardowski's with more
distinctly logical interests. Their case seems particularly interesting not
only because they were to be teachers, together with Kotarbiáski, of Tar-
ski, but because they had been actors of primary role in a crucial moment
oftransition for logic as a discipline.
Lesniewski mentions here the notion of modifying adjectives and he refers
to the §§ 19 and 59 of the Wissenschaftslehre. Although the distinction
between modifying and determining adjectives had been known since Ar-
istotle, it was very popular among Brentanians, and it played a key role in
Twardowski's 1894 theory of intentionality. It was not at all customary to
associate this notion with Bolzano, nor is it today: why does Lesniewski
here quote the Great Bohemian where one would have expected him to see
Brentano, or at least his master Twardowski? Ifthe picture showing a per-
vasive presence of Brentanian heritage in the Lvov-Warsaw School would
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Brentano [...] declared that the relation ofpredicates to their subjects according to
which the latter are not so much determined as modified by the former has been
"hitherto overlooked by logicians": he could have found this point in §23 (I, S. 92)
and §29 (I, S. 138) ofB<olzano>'s Wissenschqftslehre. Ibid in §19 (I, S. 79) even
Brentano's example of the "dead man" that is no man is adduced from Savon-
arola's Zogïc." 'Ii,jt
Juxtaposing quotations might yield witty resu1ts. But isn't my case too
thin? First of all, one might say that if Lesniewski's passage quoted above
was an attempt to express appreciation for Bolzano, it was a twisted one
indeed. Second1y, however remarkab1e might be the concordance on
Savonaro1a- by far more known for his burning reformatory zeal and the
bonfrres of vanities in the 15th Century Republic of Florence than for his
logic, except to a careful reader of Bo1zano -, I wou1d still need to show
that Lesniewski read Kerry's 1885-1891 series of papers, if what I say
about Kerry should support my cause. Unfortunate1y, there is no sucq,.evi-
dence available; furthermore, Lesniewski's reference to Bo1zano is too oe-
casional.
Is my scenario - the preferenee of Twardowski's more logically ori-
ented students for the Bolzanian over the Brentanian trend - unlikely,
then? Before nodding, think first of Twardowski's chronicle of the major
be entire1y correct, this should not have happened, one might argue.
Lesniewski should have quoted Brentano or Twardowski. So why does
Lesniewski quote Bo1zano?
Consider the following hypothesis. The logicians among Twardowski's
students became aware at a certain point of atension between a Bolzanian
(or BolzanianlFregean) and a Brentanian trend in their philosophical mi-
lieu, being consequently driven towards the former.
Actually, Lesniewski's choice to quote Bolzano in this particular con-
neetion may give the impression that he was siding with a crucial figure of
the Bolzano-Rezeption, name1y Benno Kerry.
Kerry was the first among Brentano's pupils to study Bolzano seri-
ously. It was he who attracted Twardowski's attention to Bolzano, and he
was the on1y 'organic' Brentanian to proclaim that Brentanians could have
learned a great deal from Bo1zano. Instead, the Brentanians were ignoring
him. Kerry writes:
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influences on his development, to wit, Brentano and Bo1zano, whose Wis-
senschaftslehre he said he studied "eifrigst", after Kerry had drawn his at-
tention to it.15 But note also that, despite appearances, Twardowski did not
realize, at the beginning of his activity in Poland, that Bolzano's logical
achievements surpassed those of all his contemporaries. Very positive and
explicit judgements on Bolzano's greatness in this sense and on the Wis-
senschaftslehre are to be found only in Twardowski's Actions and Prod-
ucts (published as separatum in 1911 and in 1912 in a collection), a wit-
ness of Twardowski's anti-psychologistic turn, influenced by Husserl. l6 In
fact, it is a fairly established matter that at the beginning of the 20th Cen-
tury Husserl had perhaps been the sole to grasp the greatness of Bolzano's
work." Now, Actions and Products is a work that Lesniewski read for
sure. So, one could think that it was chiefly thank to Twardowski that
Lesniewski (if at all, in 1911) got to know about the Wissenschaftslehre.
Things, actually, appear to be more complicated than this.
Actions and Products is a later work by Twardowski. It was published
16 after Twardowski's arrival in Lvov, 17 years after Zur Lehre, and 10
after Husserl's Logische Untersuchungen. That is to say, something must
have happened in the meantime that had to do, at the very least, with Bol-
zano, Husserl and psychologism. But what exactly?
When Twardowski, in his early Polish years, was asked to recommend
a logic textbook to one of his first pupils, his choice did not fall on Bol-
zano's Wissenschaftslehre, but on Höfler and Meinong's Logik. The year
was 1898, the pupil Lukasiewicz." Recalling those times fifty years later,
Lukasiewicz saw the things as follows:
Twardowski held in high esteem the writings of another priest <alongside Bren-
tano, AB> who lived in the first half of the 19th century, Bernard Bolzano. Bol-
zano was professor of science of religion at the University of Prague and was an
eminent mathematician and logician. His works in the field of philosophy have an
incomparably higher scientific level than the philosophical prattie of Kant or
Hegel. If Twardowski had realized the difference between the scientific method
applied by Bolzano and the confused and often giddy prattie of German philoso-
phers he would have been able to create a new trend of scientific philosophy, sur-
passing in worth the views ofthe Vienna Circle. Twardowski was instead [...] fas-
cinated [...] by <Brentano's> later philosophical writings, infected with psycholo-
gism."
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lIL Lukasiewicz, Twardowski and Psychologism
The first volume of Husserl's Logical Investigations made a big impression in
Lvov, especially on me. I had been disliking the psychologism cultivated by
Twardowski already for long time, now I had detached myself completely from
it.23
Husserl's Logische Untersuchungen, as we know, contained a keen ap-
praisal of Bolzano, both in words and in facts, to such an extentthat
Husserl felt compelled to tell bis readers that he was not just glossing the
Wissenschaftslehre." Thanks to Husserl's work Lukasiewicz began to de-
velop a deep aversion to psychologism early on. It is also reasonably eer-
tain that Lukasiewicz played a primary role in Twardowski's own depar-
ture from psychologism.f The exchanges between Husserl and Twar-
dowski were insignificant, and Twardowski did not have any opportunity
to discuss with Husserl in person. Lukasiewicz, Husserl's Lvov advocate,
was, on the other hand, a constant interlocutor of Twardowski. ""
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[...l the second volume of Husserl's logical investigations <sic>disappointed me.
It contained again that certain murky prattie which was driving me away from all
German philosophers. I was astonished that there could be such a difference be-
tween two volumes of the same work. Later Iconvinced myself that in the first
volume of the logical investigations it was not Husserl talking to me, but only
someone much greater than he, whom Husserl exploited in his book, and this was
Gottlob Frege.26
This passage is backed up by a lecture Lukasiewicz held in 1904,
"Husserl's thesis on the relationship between logic and psychology", in
which he claimed, following Husserl, that the logical laws cannot.be based
on psychological ones, because the latter are just probable, while the for-
mer are certain." Note, however, that in the passage above Lukasiewicz
meant only the first volume of the Investigations, the Prolegomena zur
reinen Logik (1900). The second volume (1901) he severely reproached for
being too imbibed with psychologism "to succeed in some brave reform of
pure formal logic"."
Lukasiewicz was not the only one to be astonished by the second volume
. of the Investigations. The astonishment was due to the two notions of psy-
chology employed by Husserl and common among Brentanians: genetic
psychology, an empirical science like biology, and descriptive psychology,
or phenomenology, which was what interested Husserl and was considered
an a priori science, like mathematics." Lukasiewicz accepted only the first
understanding of psychology, and it is on this basis that we must under-
stand the disagreement between him and Twardowski which emerged
during the discussion of a lecture from 1904 on Husser1.28 In his lecture
Lukasiewicz claimed that psychologicallaws are probable, to which Twar-
dowski objected that if they are evident judgements, as in the case of inner
perception, then they are as certain as mathematical laws. Lukasiewicz re-
plied that general psychological judgements are probable even if the par-
ticular judgements on which they are based are certain: far from deriving
deductively from definitions, these judgements derive inductively from ob-
servations about realobjects, because psychology is an empirical science,
and empirically are its laws obtained. Finally, Lukasiewicz explained that
evidence could not be considered a criterion of truth."
.. "",
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This passage is taken from a page of Lukasiewicz' s unpublished memoirs
in Polish written in 1949. The context is the author's memoirs from 1904
regarding the foundation of the Polish Philosophical Society by Twar-
dowski on the centenary of Immanuel Kant's death. It is understandable
that Lukasiewicz should use such unkind words for German idealism, but it
may seem incredible that he should have come close to charging Twar-
dowski with obscurantism.
Lukasiewicz's animosity against Twardowski is less puzzling than it
may seem at first, though. Although it is conceivable that after the war,
having emigrated to Dublin, Lukasiewicz was not well-disposed towards
Poland and Polish matters while writing his memoirs/" his dissatisfaction
towards Twardowski in his Lvov years had several other reasons, both per-
sonal and scientific. One scientific reason was Lukasiewicz's antipsy-
chologism, another a Generationsstreit over the conception, role and sig-
nificance of logic. Both are relevant for my Bolzanian purposes here, and
to them I shall devote the following two sections before coming back to
Lesniewski and Savonarola.
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In short, Lukasiewicz harboured a hostile attitude against what he took
to be Twardowski's conservatism in questions related to psychologism in
logic. In his Memoirs he went as far as writing this:
The apparatus of ideas and problems which Twardowski brought with him from
Vienna to Lvov was incredibly poor and sterile. Whether a conviction was a men-
tal phenomenon of a separate kind or a connexion of concepts was incessantly un-
der discussion, intuitions, presentations, concepts, their content and object were
incessantly under discussion, and no one knew whether the analyses carried out
[...] belonged to psychology, logic or grammer."
And driven by his antipsychologism and Platonism, in his memoirs Lu-
kasiewicz never misses an occasion to heap bitter words on works of
Brentanian inspiration whenever such works seemed to him excessively
psychologistic." There were aspects of Brentanian thought that Lukasie-
wicz did appreciate, but those were limited to neo-Aristotelian metaphysics
and its formal treatment, like Twardowski's mereology in Zur Lehre.32 One
might well object that these are not particularly distinctive Brentanian
traits, but Leibnizian and Bolzanian as weU.
Lukasiewicz's attitude towards the Brentanians seems to have under-
gone a change in 1907, when he became fascinated with the ideas of
Alexius Meinong, who had also studied with Brentano, contained in his
(then brand-new) work on Gegenstandstheoriei' Meinong's theory of ob-
jects had essentiaUytwo features dear to Lukasiewicz: it was a modem re-
vival of Aristotle's metaphysics (a good Brentanian element)," and, with
its plethora of non-existents and possibilia, it dovetailed with Lukasie-
wiez's surge towards a non-Aristotelian logic. One reason why Lukasie-
wicz preferred Meinong's ideas to Twardowski's (even ifbehind Meinong
there was Twardowski's pioneering and influential talk of contradictory
objects) is probably the circumstance that Twardowski, unlike Meinong,
never rejected either the principle of contradiction or the principle of the
excluded middle. &<'
Still, Lukasiewicz's fascination with Meinong was not to last long.
Moreover, more typicaUy Brentanian traits of Meinong's thought, like the
role of evidence, failed to win any favours with Lukasiewicz:
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To exploit the concept of evidence as a criterion of truth is a relic of 'psycholo-
gism' which led philosophical logic into non-viable directions. Psychologism
maintains strict links with subjectivism and skepticism. If evidence is a criterion of
truth, then every judgement seeming evident to someone is true. [... ] Every truth
becomes, thus, something subjective and relative, and absolute and objective truth
ceases to exist.35
The relationship between psychology of thinking and Logic has not always been
accepted and presented in the right way. For some define Logic as the science of
thinking or the science of correct thinking, <and> are inclined to construe logic di-
rectly as the psychology of thinking, and, therefore, as part of psychology, or at
least as some application of psychology. In this view Logic, although it is not a
part of it, should be based on psychology. This conception, known as psycholo-
gism, is not tenable."
This passage comes from Lukasiewicz's book on Aristotle, well-known in
the Polish environment at the time. These were provocative words for
Twardowski, who ten years before had fiercely defended the absolutism of
truth from relativism and skepticism, on the basis of unequivocally Bolza-
nian - though not antipsychologistic ~ arguments."
Lukasiewicz's insistence was successful, and he eventuaUy managed to
influence Twardowski's antipsychologistic turn significantly. In a manu-
script called Psychology of Thinking, containing the lectures of a course
given by Twardowski in Lvov in 1908/09, we read:
This aU-Polish evidence shows that Husserl was not the sole stimulus
Twardowski had when taking his ideas into an anti-psychologistic direc-
tion. One might be tempted to think the contrary, since in Twardowski's
Actions and Products, where the exact separation of products from acts is
said to have contributed in a decisive way to free logic from the influence
of psychology," Husserl's ideal in-specie meanings play a prominent role.
But we can be confident enough that in the manuscript passage just quoted
it is Lukasiewicz's anti-psychologistic stance on the relationship between
logic and psychology that Twardowski echoed.
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We do not have equally interesting quotes from the mature logician Lu-
kasiewicz, but we find similar passages in tone and content in his memoirs,
where he seems to be almost embarrassed by the poor knowledge of logic
he had when lecturing to students on the algebra of logic (1906). Lu-
kasiewicz regretted that his logical training under Twardowski was mötlest.
He was almost incapable of hiding his contempt when recalling Twar-
dowski's course on "Reformatory trends in logic" (1898/99) on Hamilton,
Boole and others, since, as it later turned out, it was based on Liard's "very
poor dissertation on English Iogicians"."
Lukasiewicz was a philosopher with amission: reforming logic. There is
no work by him that cannot be read as an attempt to show that traditional
logic was deficient and that it was in need of profound reform. This never
meant a Brentanian reform, though. Reform would, in his view, pass via
Platonism - astrong Bolzanian element.
Lesniewski (publicly and solemnly) and Lukasiewicz (privately) both
rejected their own early writings. Although their conceptions of logic were
to radically differ, one of the strongest reasons for their recantations was
the fact that at that time their logical tools were too poor. Here's
Lesniewski's recantation, in his characteristic style:
Steeped in the inf1uenceof John Stuart Mill's logic in which I mainly grew up, and
'conditioned' by the 'universal-grammatical' and logico-semantical problems in
the style of Edmund Husserl and of the exponents of the so-caUed Austrian
School, I attacked unsuccessfuUy the foundations of 'logistic' from this point of
view. [...l Living intellectuaUy beyond the sphere of the valuable scientific
achievements ofthe exponents of 'Mathematical Logic' and yielding to many de-
structive habits resulting from an one-sided, 'philosophico'-grammatical culture, I
struggled in the works mentioned with a number of problems which were beyond
my powers at that time, discovering already discovered Americas on the way. I '~
have mentioned those works wishing to point out that I regret very much that they
have appeared in print at all, to formaUy 'repudiate' them herewith - though I have
already done this long ago from my university chair -, and to affirm the bank-
ruptcy of the 'philosophico'-grammatical enterprises of the first period of my ac-
tivity."
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If we fol1ow Lukasiewicz's own account, it was no thanks to Twar-
dowski that he discovered mathematical logic in 1906: he became inter-
ested in Russel1 through one of his col1eagues, Marian Borowski, and was
immediately fascinated by the exactness of Russel1's method "without
philosophical drivel". He then ordered Russel1's Principles ofMathematics
through the University library in Lvov. He studied the book for months on
end, although he devoted himself to mathematical logic only later, during
the First World War. 4 1
The irony is that, objectively speaking, Lukasiewicz was, in his early
writings, less of a sharp philosopher than Twardowski. In his early writings
Lukasiewicz would often confuse use and mention of words, and there are
lethal type-confusions of objects, their concepts, classes, elements ofthose
classes, etc ... Few managed to avoid this at the time, but Twardowski and
Lesniewski were among these few.
And it must be said that Lukasiewicz's eraving for exactness and clarity
in writing and thought was a result of Twardowski's teaching, and for
these ideals Twardowski had to thank Bolzano and Brentano in equal
measure. Vet Lukasiewicz was not ready to credit Twardowski with exact-
ness in thinking, but only with the ability to systematise and clarify even
the most intricate problems." When Lukasiewicz met Lesniewski, more-
over, it became harder to regard Twardowski as an example of clarity and
exactness, as the comparison with the obsessive formal perfectionism of
Lesniewski was certainly to Twardowski's disfavour.
Twardowski was not only too old to become an enthusiastic fol1ower of
formallogic himself, he was also not pleased by the progressive 'Iogiciza-
tion' ofhis students, Lukasiewicz in primis. And Lukasiewicz, then in ful1
swing with his logical research on polyvalent logies, was almost certainly
the primary target of Twardowski's reproach in "Symbolomania and
pragmatophobia" (1921/22).43
What about Bolzano's influence upon Lukasiewicz as to some specific
logical issues? The most extensive discussion of Bolzano's ideas we find
in Lukasiewicz's Die logischen Grundlagen der Wahrscheinlichkeitsrech-
nung (1913).
According 10 Lukasiewicz it was Twardowski who attracted his atten-
tion to Bolzano's notion ofvalidity: interestingly, Lukasiewicz says that he
had already known the Wissenschaftslehre "for a long time", although he
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IV. Already Discovered Americas, that is, Old and New Logic
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V. Lesniewski, Bolzano and the Painted Fish
Back to Lesniewski and Savonarola. Apart from siding with Benno Kerry,
there is another possible reason why Lesniewski should have referred to
the passage about modifying adjectives from the Wissenschaftslehre.
Lesniewski's quote is from On the Foundations ofMathematics and the
context is his critici sm of set theory. As is known, this work has an '1.t:iuto-
biographico-synoptical character" and the quote corresponds to the years
1912-14. It is likely that Lukasiewicz and Lesniewski discussed the Bol-
zano/Savonarola passage precisely in those years, and that Lukasiewicz,
again, played a role in attracting Lesniewski's attention to Bolzano.
did not pay attention to the notion of validity." The core of Lukasiewicz's
piece on probability was already ripe in 1909.45 Twardowski had men-
tioned Gültigkeit - calling it 'logical value' - in 1911, in Actions and
Product, but no doubt Twardowski knew already Bolzano's theory of
variation, because an example involving the theory is quoted in his paper
on relative truths (with no mention of Bolzano).
An important aspect linked with the fact that Lukasiewicz 'discovered'
Bolzano's notion of validity, is his subsequent spreading of Bolzano's
ideas on the subject. Ajdukiewicz, who formulated a rather Bolzanian, pre-
Tarskian, definition of logical consequence in 1923, quoted Bolzano in
1913, in his Polish work "On the convertibility of the relation of conse-
quence", thanking Lukasiewicz for attracting his attention to Bolzano.
Note, en passant, that this circumstance does not seem to have been no-
ticed in all its significance: in its light, do we really still want to believe
that Tarski did not know Bolzano's notion of consequence when formu-
lating his own?
In conclusion, for some important aspects Lukasiewicz seems to have
been, in practice, a bigger 'Bolzanizer' in the Polish tradition than Twar-
dowski. To reinforce this claim I shall now turn to Lukasiewicz's possible
role in directing Lesniewski's interest towards Bolzano. I should wam the
reader, though, that the whole matter of the relationship between ...""
Lesniewski and Bolzano remains hypothetical.
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How did Lesniewski enter into contact with Bolzano's thought? An an-
ecdote told by Kotarbiáski has Lesniewski arrive in Lvov in 1910 carrying
Marty's Untersuchungen under his arm." As I have shown elsewhere,
Lesniewski ceased to be a follower of Marty's ideas in 1911, and arguably
had come into contact with Bolzano's ideas at least by that time (recall that
Marty was an orthodox Brentanian). There are striking similarities (mutatis
mutandis) between Bolzano's theory of truth and Lesniewski's theory in
1911-12, not to mention their common, overall classical, approach, which
Lesniewski never abandoned." Another strong element of similarity be-
tween Lesniewski and Bolzano is the adherence of both thinkers to what
has been called the Aristotelian Model of Science, and in particular to the
idea that a science is a collection of truths (objective and independent of
time!) about the objects ofthat science, with a precisely determined struc-
ture, an idea to be found everywhere in Lesniewski's work."
By 1910 Lesniewski had access to two sourees pointing explicitly to-
wards Bolzano: Twardowski's Zur Lehre, and, most importantly, Husserl's
Logische Untersuchungen, again, like in Lukasiewicz's case. Note that
Lesniewski could have known the Logische Untersuchungen even before
knowing Zur Lehre through Alexander Pfänder, with whom he had studied
in Munich (1909/10).49 And we know that Lesniewski even translated into
Polish at least part of Husserl's Untersuchungeni" The other book he was
keen to translate at the very beginning of his Lvov days was none other
than Marty's Untersuchungen. And since he was so keen on Marty's book
- if Kotarbiáski is right - he may have read Husserl's Bolzano-flavoured
1910 review of it.
Lesniewski's main interest at that time (and in fact for many years to
come, up to 1920) was the regimentation of natural language in order to .
turn natural language into an adequate tool for scientific argumentation:
both Husserl, especially in his Fourth Investigation, and Marty dealt with
this. Interestingly, the Fourth Investigation, the one in which Lesniewski
found the ancestor of his semantic categories (Husserl's Bedeutungs-
kategorie) is also the one in which Bolzano is most quoted. §2 ofHusserl's
"Fourth Investigation" discusses Bolzano and Twardowski's Zur Lehre on
the 'Land ohne Berge' example; §4 is on syncategorematic expres sions and
Bolzano's 'mistakes'; §12 is on the distinction Unsinn/Widersinn, Bolzano
and the 'round square'. All considered Bolzano must have been already at
least a household name for Lesniewski when he joined the group of Twar-
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dowski's students. Then, in 1911, Actions and Produets came out, so
Lesniewski was exposed also to Twardowski's explicit appraisal of Bol-
zano, and in the same year Lesniewski and Lukasiewicz met in Lvov.
All these elements, however, are significant only in the light ofthe fact
that by 1911 Lesniewski had aspecific reason to consider Bolzano, namely
his disagreement with Lukasiewicz on the principle of contradiction, made
public in his 1912 artiele "An attempt at proving the principle of contra-
diction". On that occasion he defended the Bolzanian and anti-Twar-
dowskian, anti-Meinongian, anti-Lukasiewiczan view that the name "round
square", though having meaning, does not denote anything."
This was a good reason to look carefully at Twardowski's fight against
Bolzano's gegenstandslose Vorstellungen in Zur Lehre, §5. Moreover,
someone else also attracted Lesniewski's attention to this point, namely
Leon Chwistek. In a work from 1912 which Lesniewski quoted in 1913,
Chwistek claimed that Bolzano stood up against the argument that expres-
sions like "round square" are nonsense, distinguishing "the concept of non-
sense from what is contrary to sense", again referring to §12 of Husserl' s
"Fourth Investigation". 52
Chwistek's work, like Lukasiewicz's, deals with the principle of con-
tradietion and eentres on various paradoxes and antinomies. Russell's an-
tinomy, mentioned in Lukasiewicz's book on Aristotle, on the one hand
awoke an interest in all other known paradoxes and antinomies, and on the
other brought up - at least in Poland - a discussion of the universal appli-
cability of the principle of contradiction. For if even mathematics is con-
tradictory, why keep the principle of contradiction? That's why
Leéniewski, who could never bring himself to believe that there was any-
thing wrong with mathematics." was so interested in proving the principle
of contradiction: he was convineed that there could never be contradiction
in reality or in our reconstruction of it, and particularly not in mathematics.
Enter Savonarola. In Lesniewski's philosophy at the time, as was stan-
dard in the Lvov philosophical milieu, Russell's paradox and three ~her
themes, the principle of contradiction, the principle of excluded middle and
the liar paradox, were brought together under the same heading: the se-
mantics of empty names and in particular the semantics of what Bolzano
would call 'objectless propositions'. Both Lesniewski and Lukasiewicz
worked on their respective solutions to the Liar in the period to which
Conclusion
Lesniewski's passage from On the Foundations of Mathematics corre-
sponds. Lesniewski's solution, published in 1913, comprises a ban on self-
reference, which also Bolzano discusses, and he thinks, like Bolzano, that
the Liar is false;" Lukasiewicz maintained in 1915 that Liar-sentences are
outside the scope of logic: they aren't well-formed sentences and they can-
not be employed in logical transtormations.f Now Lukasiewicz's stand is
exactly the same as Savonarola's as quoted by Bolzano: the Liar is no
proposition, exactly like a dead man is no man and a painted fish is not a
fish.
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Suppose that what I said to back up my case is convincing, that indeed
Twardowski blindness to Bolzano's stature and his overall Brentanian
teaching was a regrettable thing to some of his pupils, and that it was in
fact rather Lukasiewicz the one who played the main role in adjusting Bol-
zano's image and in spreading some of the novelties of Bolzano's logic.
Well, then, there is still a good number of questions which the above con-
siderations leave wide open. We may agree that you have to be a logician,
or at least logically-minded, possibly an anti-psychologist, and perhaps a
Platonist, to appreciate Bolzano. We do not have much material, though,
let alone published or in vehicular languages, that might help us disentan-
gle the as yet intricate matter of Bolzano's influence in Poland and how
this related to Brentanian inputs, even if we limit the scope, as I have done,
to some of Twardowski's students. The conjectures I have advanced, in-
cluding Twardowski's negative role, need more support than I have been
able to provide. What I said does not go far towards proving, for instance,
that Lesniewski did read the Wissenschaftslehre, or, if so, read it before the
1914 edition appeared, ifthis is what we aim at. Could he? Was a pre-1914
edition of Wissenschaftslehre available to Twardowski's students? The
kind of philosophy Twardowski was to teach was terra incognita when
Twardowski moved to Lvov, so there is no guarantee that a copy of Wis-
senschaftslehre was around before 1914. Unless, of course, Twardowski
brought a copy with him, for he put his personal library at his students'
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disposal. Was the copy he used in Vienna his own? To quote Peter
• 56 dl" 57Simons, "answers on a postcar ,p ease .
My aim has been to show that a critical in depth assessment of the real
meaning of "Polish Brentanism", independently of what we can infer from
Twardowski's own story, and with particular attention to Bolzano's role, is
an urgent matter, though not an easy one." To make headway with this we
will have to publish editions, search for manuscript material, train young
scholars interested in digging things out. Do pracy!
• A version of this paper has been presented at the Bo/zano Atelier in Geneva in Sep-
tember/October 2001 under the title "Twardowski's Misunderstanding ofBolzano and
its Polish Consequences", which I owed to Kevin Mulligan, and under which other
versions have circulated so faro I am indebted to Arkadiusz Chrudzimski and Jan
Woleûski for comments, to Bjem Jespersen, Göran Sundholm for suggesting language
improvements, and to Marije Martijn for comments, language and stylistic improve-
ments on a previous version. Thanks also to Jan Woleáski and Jan Siek, director ofthe
library ofthe Institute ofPhilosophy and Sociology ofWarsaw University, for having
provided me with copies of the valuable manuscripts I use in the text, and to Jacek
Juliusz Jadacki, custodian of Twardowski's Archives, for allowing me to quote from ''''"
this material. Work on this paper has been funded by the Netherlands Scientific Re-
search Organization (NWO), project no. 275-80-001.
ICf. Twardowski (1894/5) and Twardowski (1895/6). The edition of these manuscripts
is in progress. A 50-page draft English résumé of the latter can be downloaded from
the Polish Philosophy Page at http://www.fmag.unict.it/PoIPhil/TwardITwardLog.html
The manuscripts and the letters quoted in this paper are all housed in the Library of the
Institute ofPhilosophy and Sociology at the University ofWarsaw.
2 Cf. Ingarden (1938), p. 25.
3 See the influential Woleáski & Simons (1989).
4 See for instanee Woleáski (1999b).
5 See Betti (2005a), KUnne(2003), pp. 180-4, Woleáski & Simons (1989), pp. 430 fn
24. Siebel (1996) challenges the vulgate on the Bolzano-Tarski consequence rel~ion,
thereby confirming the existence ofstandard lore on this issue.
6 Cf. on the fITSt point KUnne(1997), p. 74 and (2003) pp. 186-9. On the second point,
Batóg (1995). On the third point, Betti (2005c) in which I suggest that non-Brentanian
stances in the analysis of truth-bearers and their ontological counterparts in the early
Lesniewski, Lukasiewicz and Kotarbiáski come, via Twardowski, from Bolzano.
Other Polish works dealing with Bolzano or mentioning him are: Biegaáski (1912),
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Fränklówna (1914), Smolka (1927), Kotarbiáski (1929), Wiegner (1930), as reported
by Batóg (1995), and most of all Jan Franciszek Drewnowski's doctoral thesis under
Kotarbiáski, Podstawy /ogiki Bernarda Bo/zana (1927), entirely devoted to Bolzano -
but destroyed during the Second World War. A Polish translation of Bolzano's Para-
doxes appeared, with Kotarbiáski's preface, in 1966. On Fränklówna (1914) see
KUnne(2003), pp. 184-5.
7 On Twardowski's criticism of Brentano's theory of judgement, see Betti & van der
Schaar (2004). On Meinong's see Rollinger (2005). On Meinong's and Husserl's,
Rollinger (2004), especially pp. 270 andff
8 The meaning of expressions like 'Brentanism' or 'Brentanian tradition' when more is
meant than a genealogical li~e of pupils and students starting from Brentano, seems to
me already rather difficult to define in a satisfactory way. Though I will use freely
these and similar expressions in this paper, I am aware that this issue is more relevant
to the main thesis ofthis paper than I will be able to account for here.
9 Andpace KUnne(1997), pp. 41 and tI., (2003), p. 180; cf. Husserl (1896). By "two-
fold notion ofthe object of a (subjective) Vorstellung", I mean that there is a sense in
which all Bolzanian subjective presentations (Twardowski's presentations) can be
taken to have an object, this object being a presentation-in-itself, and being what is
thinkab/e in a subjective presentation, cf. Bolzano WL §99 (I 461), §67 (I 305) and cf.
also Bolzano-Exner p. 11 11. 26-34. Although it's clear that for Bolzano the object of a
subjective presentation is the object of the presentation-in-itself contained in the
subjective presentation, cf. Bolzano-Exner p. 26 ll. 19-22 and 69 11. 31-4, the point is
what stance one takes on the relation between object and thinkab/e.
10 Cf. also KUnne(1997), p. 56.
II For the record, in Zur Lehre Twardowski quotes, in this order, §289, §49, §67, §89,
§103, §108, then again §49, §65, §1l2, §58, §90, §64, §63, §68 ofBolzano's Wissen-
schafls/ehre. Bolzano's name, with approximately thirty occurrences, is the most cited
in this work.
12 For Bolzano and the early Lesniewski cf. Betti (1998b), (2005a), (2005c).
13 Lesniewski (1927), p. 196, fn 1. Eng. TransI. p. 214, fn 19, reproduced here with
changes. Translations from Polish are mine unless otherwise indicated.
14 Cf. Kerry (1885-1891), VIII, pp. 135-6. The translation from German is mine. The
passage is also quoted in KUnne(1997), p. 34.
15 Cf. Twardowski (1926), p. 10.
16 Cf. Twardowski (1911), p. 30. Eng. Trans. p. 131.
17 Cf. Sebestik (2003), p. 62.
18 Cf. Lukasiewicz (1949-54), p. 38 verso.
19 Lukasiewicz (1949-54), p. 57. The passage quoted also in Jadezak (1997), p. 46-7.
20 Göran Sundholm has suggested this to me. Actually, this might explain how Lu-
kasiewicz could suggest that the philosophical achievements of the Vienna Circle
could be superior to the ones ofthe Lvov-Warsaw School: he had clearly denied this
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superiority in 1936, at least concerning the Viennese anti-metaphysical stand. Cf. Lu-
kasiewicz (1936).
21 Cf. in Husserl (1900/01), the Anhang to the Prolegomena.
22 By 'psychologism' in this paper exclusively psychologism in logic is meant, that is,
in all generality the view that logic ought to be based on psychology.
23 Lukasiewicz (1949-54), p. 57 v.
24 Cf. Lukasiewicz (1904a), p. 341.
2S Cf. Lukasiewicz (1905), p. 469.
26 Lukasiewicz (1949-54), p. 57 v. There are 45 years of difference between the quota-
tions I use in this section, but we do not have reasons to think Lukasiewicz changed
his mind in this respect.
27 The kind of accusation put forward by Lukasiewicz was so common that (in the
third edition of his work) Husserl referred to it, as a groteske Vorwurf. Cf. Husserl
(HUA), B2 III. Cf. also Bell (1990), p. 86.
28 Cf. Lukasiewicz (1904a) and the repliescontained in it to an anonymous speaker.
Some, including myself, have taken the anonymous speaker to he Twardowski (cf.
also Rojszczak (1996), p. 140). This does not seem entirely sure, however. Lu-
kasiewicz (1904a) is a report ofthe Husserllecture, which was split in two meetings of
the Polish Philosophical Society in Lvov, on 11 and 25 May 1904. According to
Jadezak (1997), p. 43, in that period Twardowski spent several months abroad, and in
a letter dated 17 May 1904 (cf. (1904b» Lukasiewicz reports to Twardowski on the
meeting of 11 May. So, Twardowski was not present at the first meeting. He could
have been present at the second one, but I have not been able to check this.
29 See also the passage on the next page. .l)-
30 Lukasiewicz (1949-54), p. 57 v. Note the last line: "at the borders oflogic, psychol-
ogy and grammar" was the subtitle ofTwardowski (1911). The passage is quoted also
in Ingarden (2000), p. 65 and in Jadezak (1997), p. 47.
31 Cf. in Lukasiewicz (1910), p. 28 the footnote against Höfler & Meinong (1890).
32 Cf. Lukasiewicz (1904c), also quoted in Jadezak (1997), pp. 43-4.
33 Cf. Lukasiewicz (1909).
34 Ibidem.
3S Cf. Lukasiewicz (1910), p. 104. In the letter of 19 November 1908 from Graz Lu-
kasiewicz tells Twardowski that he could not reach an agreement with Meinong re-
garding evidence. The relevant fragment is also quoted in Jadezak (1997), pp. 46-7.
36 Cf. Twardowski (1900).
37 Twardowski (1908/09). Twardowski's turn could be dated to ca. 1907. Sapport
comes from Rojszczak (1996, p. 140), who quotes as significant the fact that in Lu-
kasiewicz (1907) there was no discussion similar to the one mentioned above regard-
ing Lukasiewicz's 1904lecture (but see fn 28 above). An opponent ofmy thesis might
argue that Twardowski himself in his Selbstdarstellung (cf. Twardowski (1926), pp.
19-20) states to have been convineed by Husserl's Logische Untersuchungen to aban-
don psychologism, and does not mention Lukasiewicz. To this I would answer that in
the passages in question Twardowski aims at portraying himself as an early follower
ofthe antipsychologistic trend. All other evidence points however in the direction on a
later adoption ofthis stance.
38 Cf. Twardowski (1911), p. 31; Eng. trans. p. 132.
39 I juxtapose here two passages: the piece before '[...l' is from Chapter I of
Lesniewski (1927), p. 169, that thereafter is from Chapter II ofthe same work, p. 182-
3. The latter, rather famous, passage is easier to interpret in the context ofthe theme of
this section. It has been read as a pure and simple recantation of Lesniewski's early
writings, but the difficulty with this is that there is continuity in Lesniewski's oeuvre.
When the passage is placed in the context ofthe theme ofthis paper it becomes c1earer
that the recantation is less about Lesniewski's philosophical convictions in those
works than about his research tools at the time. I reproduced the English translation (p.
181 and 197-8) with changes.
40 Lukasiewicz (1949-54), pp. 59-60. Despite what other sourees report, it is uncertain
whether Twardowski dealt with Bolzano in that course.
41 Cf. Lukasiewicz (1949/54), p. 60. I think Woleáski is absolutely right in saying that
the level of Lukasiewicz's teaching at the time probably did not exceed the level of
Couturat's L 'Algèbre de la Logique (1905), on which the Appendix to Lukasiewicz
(1910) was based. Cf. Wolenski (1999a), p. 65.
42 Lukasiewicz (1949/54), 61r. See also Jadezak (1997), p. 49.
43 Cf. Twardowski (1921/22). See also Jadezak (1997), p. 49. Twardowski's attitude in
this piece would deserve extensive treatment in conneetion with the changes in the
conception of logic in Poland in those years, rather than the few scattered remarks I
offer here.
44 Cf. Lukasiewicz (1913), §24. Despite different accounts (Simons (1989», Lu-
kasiewicz's own theory ofprobability seems to have been influenced not by Meinong,
but by Bolzano. True, Meinong's ideas on probability were mentioned by Stumpfin a
footnote of his 1892 work on probability which Lukasiewicz also quotes, where Bol-
zano is completely absent, and, moreover, Lukasiewicz spent some time with Stumpf
in Berlin in 1905. Yet Lukasiewicz himself says explicitly that "<my> ideas were not
after Meinong" cf. Lukasiewicz (1949-54), pp. 61r, 61v. The influence of Bolzano
seems to be evident when we examine the notion of undetermined sentence (unbe-
stimmte Aussage), cf. also Childers & Majer (1998), Niiniluoto (1998) and Künne
(2003), p. 180-4.
4S The first time Bolzano's name appears in Lukasiewicz's works - next to Cantor's
and Dedekind's - is as early as 1905, in Lukasiewicz's lecture on the concept ofinfin-
ity. This is linked to the Paradoxes ofthe Infinite, but not to the Wissenschaflslehre (as
far as I know, Twardowski never dealt with the Paradoxes).
46 Cf. Kotarbinski (1966), p. 157.
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